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There is a large literature on the relationship between globalization and human capital formation in
a macroeconomic context. In this paper, we consider a mechanism that works at the microeconomic
level through intra-household bargaining. Within each household, bargaining takes place between
the mother and father to determine how their joint income is spent. Assuming that they have
diﬀerent preferences towards fertility and child education, they face a tradeoﬀ between the quality
and the quantity of children. Based on studies in the development literature, we assume that
women have a stronger relative preference towards quality of children than men do, while men put
more weight of the number of children.
If the process of globalization leads to better labor market opportunities for women, the bargain-
ing power of women improves and subsequently shifts child outcomes towards her preferences. If
this is the case, we will observe lower fertility and higher child education levels within a household,
and therefore, human capital formation will increase. Similarly, if globalization produces relatively
better labor market opportunities for the male, then the equilibrium outcome will shift towards his
preferences, and human capital formation will fall.
The literature on women empowerment in developing countries generally shows that greater la-
bor market access and participation, which create independent income, improve the decision making
power of women and give them more control over the allocation of household resources. In this
context, labor supplied outside the household is a factor that aﬀects intra-household bargaining by
changing the threat points of the bargaining process. However, parental labor supply is endoge-
nous to child schooling. The time constraint of parents force them to allocate their time between
household and market activities, leading to fertility levels that are simultaneously determined with
labor market activity, which in turn inﬂuences their children’s probability of schooling.
After controlling for household income, the eﬀect of diﬀerential labor supply on child schooling
can be identiﬁed using variations in market conditions that are exogenously given to the household.
If these changes in market conditions aﬀect the child only through the changes in parental outcomes,
they can serve as an instrument for the relationship between intra-household bargaining and child
outcomes. In this paper, we identify this relationship by exploiting the variation in tariﬀ rates in
India. India experienced substantial trade liberalization since 1991 and has detailed micro-level
2data that allows us to understand the extent to which changes in parental labor market activity
due to reduced tariﬀs aﬀect child schooling. We focus on the schooling probability of children who
are too young to be productive in the labor market but old enough to attend school. The household
survey data shows that children between the ages of 7 and 10 ﬁt these speciﬁcations as they are
mostly idle if they are not attending school, so we focus our analysis on this age group.
Our results show that lower tariﬀs are associated with higher market labor supply for both
mothers and fathers. In the second stage analysis, we observe that our assumption about prefer-
ences holds. Children in households in which the mother supplied more labor hours had higher
school attendance and fewer siblings. On the other hand, a higher labor supply for the father was
associated with lower school attendance and more siblings.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we consider market labor supply
as a source of bargaining power within the household and test the eﬀect of diﬀerential labor supply
on child outcomes after controlling for the combined household expenditure and other household
characteristics. This approach allows us to separate the eﬀect on child outcomes that originates
from female autonomy associated with market labor supply from changes in household income.
While testing the eﬀect of labor supply, we consider possible sources of endogeneity related to
fertility.
Our second contribution is that we exploit the variation in tariﬀ rates in parental industries
and use this variation as an instrument for labor supply. This allows us to identify the eﬀect of
changes in diﬀerential labor supply due to tariﬀ reductions on the schooling of children. Third, we
use the Indian household survey data to generate child data that links each child to parent and
household characteristics. We exploit the micro-level information in the survey that provides us
with information about the relationship between bargaining power and child outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the literature. Section 3 introduces
the data set used in this paper and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the trade
reform in India and its impact on parental labor supply. Section 5 reports our results and Section
6 concludes.
32 Literature Review
Observed child quality and quantity are considered to be an outcome of a collective decision that is
made at the household level. Within each household, individuals are assumed to have heterogeneous
preferences. Unitary household models that assume income pooling and a representative household
utility function have generally been rejected by the empirical evidence (Browning and Chiappori,
1998; Duﬂo, 2003; Duﬂo and Udry, 2001; Pitt, Rosenweig and Nazmul, 1990; Quisumbing and
Maluccio, 2003; and Thomas, 1991). Consequently, if the mother and father place diﬀerent weights
on fertility and child quality in their utility functions, then equilibrium outcomes will reﬂect their
relative bargaining power.
Following Anderson and Eswaran (2009), labor supplied outside of the household is considered
as a source of female autonomy that increases the value of her outside option and thus her rel-
ative bargaining power. They distinguish between the diﬀerent forms of labor participation for
women when analyzing female autonomy and conclude that employment outside of the household
contributes to female autonomy rather than overall employment.
Although we don’t directly observe the bargaining process, we can infer it by examining the
outcome of the bargaining process, which is in this case, child schooling. In this paper, we use the
variation in tariﬀ rates to identify the eﬀect of labor supply on schooling rates. First, trade aﬀects
the labor market outcomes of parents. These eﬀects may be diﬀerent for the mother and father,
as trade diﬀerentially aﬀects industries in which males and females may have relative advantages.
Next, the changes in the labor market outcomes aﬀect the tradeoﬀ between child quality and
quantity through intra-household bargaining.
The idea behind the empirical approach in this paper follows from the theoretical model de-
veloped by Rees and Riezman (2008). They view the globalization process as creating market
opportunities for employment in developing countries. Based on the empirical literature, they as-
sume that women have a stronger relative preference towards the quality of children and men have
a stronger relative preference towards the quantity of children. In this framework, if the market
opportunities created by globalization are higher for women, women’s bargaining power within the
household improves and the post-globalization equilibrium involves lower fertility and higher child
quality. On the other hand, if the opportunities are better for men, then globalization should
4increase fertility and lower child quality.
Parental labor supply is often endogenous to child outcomes. Theory on the eﬀects of fertility
on labor supply generally focuses on two channels. First, as the number of children increases,
there will be more specialization within the household as women allocate more time to childcare
(Becker, 1985). Second, fertility has a direct eﬀect on the value of both parent’s time in household
production, often referred to as the ‘home-intensity eﬀect’. As a result, the theory predicts a
reduction in the mother’s labor supply, but the net eﬀect on the father’s labor supply will depend
on the relative magnitudes of specialization and home-intensity eﬀects (Kim and Aasve, 2006).
Another tradeoﬀ that households face is between the quality and quantity of children. The shadow
prices of child quality and quantity are strongly linked, and therefore, exogenous changes may
lead to substitution between these two variables (Lam and Duryea, 1999). A mother with a large
number of children may choose to allocate more time towards home production and less time in
market production. This may lead to higher quality children even though the number of children
is large.
Within the empirical literature, the link between labor supply decisions and the child quality-
quantity tradeoﬀ has been widely studied. Angrist and Evans (1998) use the gender composition
of ﬁrst two children as an instrument to fertility. If the parents prefer a mixed-gender composition
among children and if the ﬁrst two children are of the same gender, the family will have a higher
probability of having a third child.1 In fact, they show that, in the U.S., having two boys or two
girls increases the probability of having a third child by about 6 percent. Using this instrument,
they ﬁnd that having an additional child reduces the female labor market participation probability
by 12 percent and labor supply by about 5 hours a week. Although they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the father’s labor supply, later studies that use the same data set have identiﬁed a positive eﬀect.
If a mother’s and a father’s labor supply are perfect substitutes, the reduction in a mother’s
labor supply may be balanced by a proportional increase in a father’s labor supply. In this case,
we should see a positive eﬀect for the father. Lundberg and Rose (2000) compare families before
1Earlier literature uses twins as an instrument for fertility. For example, see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980),
Bronars and Grogger (1994), and Gangadharan and Rosenbloom (1996). However, having twins at the ﬁrst birth is
a sparse occurrence in the data. Second, the age diﬀerence between the second and third child is necessarily larger
if the ﬁrst two children are twins. This would bias the estimates since the eﬀect on labor supply is larger when the
children are younger. For these reasons, the gender composition approach has been generally preferred over using
twins as an instrument in this context.
5and after their ﬁrst birth in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework, using households with no children
as the control group. Their ﬁndings suggest that the ﬁrst child leads to a 5 percent reduction in
the mother’s wages and a 9 percent increase in the father’s wages. They also note that even before
the ﬁrst child, the labor market activities of the male and female are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, and
mothers make about 9 percent less than fathers on average. In another study (Lundberg and Rose,
2002), they test whether the father’s labor market response depends on the gender of the child and
ﬁnd that the father’s labor supply and wages increase more in response to a birth of a son than to
the birth of a daughter.
Most of these results seem to hold in developing countries as well as developed countries, es-
pecially in rural areas. For example, Kim and Aasve (2006) use data from Indonesia, a country
that moved from a high fertility-low income equilibrium to a low fertility-high income equilibrium
between 1970 and 1995. They ﬁnd that in rural areas, mothers decrease hours of work by 1.1 hours
per child whereas men increase their labor supply by 0.9 hours. In urban areas, they ﬁnd similar
results for women, but no signiﬁcant eﬀect for men. Jungmin Lee (2008) uses the preference for
sons to identify the tradeoﬀ between child quality and quantity in South Korea. He estimates a
reproduction function to show that families have a strong preference towards sons and that the
probability of having a second child is much higher if the ﬁrst child is a daughter. Based on these
results, he uses the gender of the ﬁrst child as an instrument to identify the child quality-quantity
relationship and estimates a negative elasticity of per-child education investment with respect to
fertility.
Atkin (2009) analyzes the eﬀect of factory openings on child health in Mexico. In order to
account for the unobserved characteristics of women who choose to work, he uses women whose
ﬁrst job was in the manufacturing sector as an instrument. He ﬁnds that the expansion in employ-
ment opportunities due to factory openings induce women to work which improve their bargaining
power within the household. In addition, women who began to work after the factory opens have
signiﬁcantly healthier children.
Edmonds et al. (2007) look at the eﬀect of medium and short-term adjustment costs on schooling
rates using the variation between Indian districts, and ﬁnd that districts that experienced an average
tariﬀ reduction have 2 percentage points less improvement in schooling rates compared to districts
with no tariﬀ reduction. The current paper employs a very diﬀerent approach than Edmonds et
6al. (2007). We are interested in the eﬀect of intra-household bargaining power of individuals due
to their market activity as it translates into child schooling rates after controlling for the combined
wealth of the households. In particular, we look at the eﬀects of the changes in these market
activities resulting from tariﬀ changes. For this reason, the results of the current paper should be
interpreted within this particular framework.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use the Employment and Unemployment Survey conducted by the Indian National Sample
Survey Organization (NSSO). The NSSO adopted a quinquennial survey program that incorporates
a nationally representative sample.2 This is one of the largest and oldest household surveys for a
developing country. Our analysis relies on the 43rd, 50th, and 55th rounds of this survey in rural
and urban India and covers a time period of 12 years from 1988 to 2000. The collected information
includes household characteristics, as well as individual level variables that are related to labor
market outcomes. Each individual reports up to ﬁve activities and time spent in each activity. The
types of activities include: working in a household enterprise as an own account worker, employer,
or unpaid family worker; working as a regular salaried/wage employee; working as a casual wage
laborer in public works or in other types of work; attending an educational institution; attending
to domestic duties; and engaging in the free collection of goods for household use. Because we
are interested in market labor provided by the mother and father even when it is not their most
important activity, we exploit this aspect of the data when determining parental labor supply levels.
Once we determine the parental labor market variables for each child, we convert the individual
level data so that each observation is for one child, and other variables such as education level,
parental labor market variables, and household characteristics are also speciﬁed for each child.
We exclude multiple family households as the interaction between diﬀerent families within these
household may alter the child outcomes. We also exclude households in which one of the parents
is absent.
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the tariﬀ rates in parental industries; therefore, the indi-
rect eﬀect of tariﬀs on children’s educational outcomes through parental labor supply should be
2In addition to the quinquennial surveys based on ‘thick samples’, NSS implements additional surveys between
the successive quinquennial rounds that are based on much smaller ‘thin samples’.
7signiﬁcant, but the direct eﬀect should be minimal or insigniﬁcant. We focus on children between
the ages of 7 to 10 years old, because this age group is unlikely to actively participate in the labor
market, especially menial labor, while they are old enough to attend primary school.3 The pattern
in the data suggests that children within this age group are mostly idle if they are not attending
school. This can be seen in Table 1, which summarizes children’s principal activities by age group
and gender. Between the ages of 7 and 10, only 52 percent of girls were reported to have attended
school in 1988, which increases to 74 and 79 percent in 1993 and 2000, respectively. Over the same
time period, the proportion of girls who are idle has decreased from 43 percent to 18 percent. Hence,
in a period of twelve years there has been a 27 percentage point improvement in schooling and a 25
percentage point reduction in being idle among girls within this age group. Similarly, the schooling
rate among boys was 59 percent in 1988 and 86 percent in 2000, recording a 27 percentage point
improvement. At the same time, the proportion of boys who are idle decreased by 25 percentage
points from 38 percent to 13 percent.
There was little change in market and domestic work for both boys and girls, suggesting that
almost the entire improvement in schooling within this age group came from children who previously
were idle and not actively participating in domestic work or market labor. On the other hand, a
signiﬁcant proportion of children between the ages of 11 and 14 are engaged in child labor and
thus facing a tradeoﬀ between schooling and work. This is consistent with the approach followed
by Edmonds et al. (2007), which focuses on older school age children while analyzing the eﬀect of
trade liberalization on the tradeoﬀ between child labor and schooling. The most improvement in
this time period was among girls between ages 11 and 14, of whom 9 percent reported market labor
and 18 percent reported domestic labor as their principal activity in 1988. These ratios decreased
to 5 percent and 11 percent in 2000. Among boys, there was an 8 percentage point improvement
in schooling and a 5 percentage point reduction in market labor. A very small percentage of boys
reported domestic labor as their principal activity.
Next, we move to the characteristics of the household. The upper left panel in Table 2 reports
the fertility rates by year and sector. Over the sample period, the average number of children
per household has decreased by 0.21 for urban households and 0.08 for rural households. Rural
3Although some children are reported to attend school at ages 5 or 6, we do not include this age group in our
analysis. The reason is that a signiﬁcant proportion of these children are attending pre-school from which some
parents may opt out even when they have strong preferences towards education.
8households have higher levels of fertility and lower per capita income levels in all rounds. We
observe a signiﬁcant increase in per capita income levels for both rural and urban households, even
after correcting for inﬂation.
Parental education is an indicator variable that switches on if the parent had any education in
the past. Using this deﬁnition, only 24 percent of rural mothers reported that they had any schooling
in 1988, with this ratio increasing to 34 percent by 2000. On the other hand, the percentage of urban
fathers who had any education was 80 percent in 1988 and 83 percent in 2000. The percentage of
urban mothers who had any education was 58 percent in 1988 and 67 percent in 2000. Only 53
percent of rural fathers had any education in 1988, while this ratio has increased to 60 percent in
2000. This clearly shows that education levels are substantially higher among fathers which will be
taken into account in the empirical analysis.
NSS reports weekly labor supply for each individual for diﬀerent activities. Because we are
interested in labor supply which can generate bargaining power within the household, we exclude
domestic labor and labor provided to household enterprises. It is not likely that these types of
activities improve female autonomy and move the child quality/quantity equilibrium towards her
preferences.
Market activities considered in this paper are the following: regular employee wage/salaried
labor, casual wage labor in public works, and casual wage labor in other types of works. Participa-
tion and labor supply variables reported in Table 2 are based on these activities. Only 12 percent
of urban mothers and 26 percent of rural mothers participated in these activities in 1988. These
rates increased to 14 percent and 32 percent by 2000, indicating a 2.1 and 6.4 percentage point
increase in twelve years.
Participation in market activities is much higher among fathers. Fifty-nine percent of urban
fathers and 41 percent of rural fathers participated in market activities in 1988. By 2000, these
rates increased very little to 59 percent and 47 percent for urban and rural fathers, respectively.
An interesting observation is that in urban areas, participation in market activities is lower among
mothers and higher among fathers relative to rural areas. This may be due to lower overall labor
market production among females in urban areas. In fact, if we include labor provided to household
enterprises in our deﬁnition, the participation ratio of urban mothers remains signiﬁcantly lower
than rural mothers (17 percent and 37 percent), while the participation ratios of urban and rural
9fathers becomes very similar (97 percent and 98 percent).
The labor supply in market activities is reported in terms of days per week and includes non-
participation.4 In rural areas, maternal labor supply in market activities was 0.77 days a week in
1988 and 0.87 days a week in 2000, indicating a 13 percent increase. On the other hand, urban
fathers supplied much more labor than urban mothers and had a relatively modest increase of 5
percent. In rural areas, both maternal and paternal labor supply in market activities increased by
approximately 13 percent. The labor supply levels reported in Table 2 are lower than overall labor
supply since we focus only on speciﬁc activities.
Let’s now turn to the tradeoﬀ between child quality and quantity which is presented in Figure
1. Schooling rates are shown for children between the ages of 7 and 10. The probability that a
child attends school decreases signiﬁcantly as the number of children within a household increases.
For example, in urban areas in the year 1988, the average schooling rate for households with 1
child was approximately 82 percent, and decreased to 61 percent for households with 7 children.
This negative relationship holds for both rural and urban households for each survey round. In
general, attendance rates are lower in rural areas than in urban areas. However, they possess a
similar structure in terms of the child quality and quantity tradeoﬀ.
4 Tariﬀ Rates and Labor Supply
Table 3 reports summary statistics on tariﬀ rates in India. India’s post-independence development
strategy has relied heavily on self-suﬃciency. There were heavy restrictions on almost all tradable
sectors prior to the trade reform. In 1988, the average ad-valorem tariﬀ for the agriculture sector
was 116.2 percent while in manufacturing it was 117.5 percent. In 1991, India went through very
extensive trade liberalization in compliance with the conditions imposed by the IMF. Subsequently,
the average tariﬀ in the agriculture sector was reduced to 35.9 percent by 2000 and the average tariﬀ
in the manufacturing sector was reduced to 38.3 percent. Trade liberalization came as a surprise
to the political community as well as to the production markets. As a result, there was little or
no room for political economy concerns in the extent and dispersion of the tariﬀ reductions. The
IMF conditions required reductions in all industries regardless of the pre-reform tariﬀ rates. The
4NSS reports labor supply as number of days in a week, which we use throughout this study. One could multiply
these numbers by the usual work hours per day in India.
10reductions in tariﬀs were not signiﬁcantly correlated with the initial tariﬀ rates, skill intensities, or
the initial productivity levels of the industries (Topalova, 2004).
We use the variation in tariﬀ rates to identify the eﬀect of parental labor supply on schooling.
Because it would take some time for trade policy to aﬀect labor supply, we use 2-year lagged tariﬀ
rates.5 The household survey we use reports the industry aﬃliation for each individual, allowing us
to merge these tariﬀ rates to parental industry aﬃliation for each child. This restricts our sample
to children whose parents are working in traded industries, reducing our sample size to 30,512
children.
The extent to which trade reform aﬀects labor supply works mainly through the increase in
labor demand and earning opportunities, which are aﬀected by changes in the relative prices of the
domestic economy. If the labor market opportunities created by trade liberalization aﬀect males
diﬀerently than females, then it will aﬀect the relative bargaining position within the household.
The eﬀect could be systematic if, for example, male workers have a comparative advantage in
‘brawn’ intensive industries and female workers have a comparative advantage in ‘brain’ intensive
industries. More speciﬁcally, if male and female workers have the same amounts of ‘brains’, but
males have more ‘brawn’, then industries can be characterized as female relative advantage indus-
tries and male relative advantage industries (Saure and Zoabi, 2009). If trade liberalization causes
specialization in female relative advantage industries, then employment opportunities should in-
crease more for female workers relative to male workers. Saure and Zoabi (2009) show that if the
labor markets are perfectly ﬂexible, this may result in an inﬂow of male workers to female relative
advantage industries, where the marginal productivity of females would decrease and females would
be driven out of the labor market.
As far as the overall employment eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions are concerned, there is a strand
of empirical literature on India that ﬁnds estimates that are not consistent with the predictions
of Hecksher-Ohlin model. One crucial assumption of this model, perfect factor mobility may be
violated in developing countries due to rigid labor laws and industry regulations. Although a
comprehensive review of these regulations is beyond the scope of this paper, the implications in
5Speciﬁcally, we use the 1986 tariﬀs for the 43rd round, the 1991 tariﬀs for the 50th round, and the 1998 tariﬀs
for the 55th round. The 1986 tariﬀ rates are extrapolated using the percentage reduction between 1988 and 1999.
Because tariﬀ rates remained almost constant prior to the trade liberalization in 1991, the extrapolation provides
tariﬀ rates that are very close to the true tariﬀ rates.
11terms of the trade-employment relationship has been widely studied in the literature. In a recent
study, Hasan, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) look at the eﬀect of trade liberalization on unemployment
in India and they ﬁnd almost no evidence that unemployment rises with trade liberalization. In
contrast, they ﬁnd that unemployment decreases with reduced protection, especially in states with
ﬂexible labor markets and in urban areas.
In addition, employment can rise with trade liberalization due to the high productivity gains
that were experienced in India (Felbermayr, Prat, and Schemenr, 2008). If trade reduces variable
costs and induces more productive ﬁrms to enter the industry, then trade liberalization will increase
employment. Khadelwal and Topalova (2010) ﬁnd that tariﬀ reductions in India increased total
factor productivity through a pro-competitive eﬀect due to lower output tariﬀs, and through access
to better inputs due to lower input tariﬀs. Other studies such as Goldar (2002) show that growth
in employment has accelerated in India after 1991, and that export oriented industries employed
relatively more women than import competing industries.
5 Empirical Approach and Discussion of the Results
5.1 Schooling and Parental Labor Supply
In each household, both mothers and fathers face a tradeoﬀ between home production and market
production. In addition, there is a substantial amount of specialization within the household.
Empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of children can cause women to specialize
in home production and men to specialize in market production, even when there is no specialization
at the initial equilibrium. Thus, in analyzing the impact of trade on labor supply, the eﬀect of
heterogeneous fertility should be taken into account. Consider the following schooling regression:
yiht = α0 + α1Mhjt + α2Phkt + α3nht + α4Xht + α5Ciht + γt + φjt + φkt + iht (1)
where yiht is a binary variable for whether or not child i in household h at time t attends school.
Mhjt is the labor supply of a mother in household h and industry j at time t and Phkt is the
labor supply of a father in household h and industry k at time t. nht is the number of children in
household h at time t. Xht is a variable of household characteristics such as religion, social class,
12and per capita expenditure, as well as labor market characteristics of the mother and father such
as education and age. Ciht represents the characteristics of the child including age and age-squared
and a binary variable for boys. γt is year ﬁxed eﬀects that controls for macroeconomic shocks
that are common to all individuals, while the industry ﬁxed eﬀects φjt and φkt control for industry
speciﬁc shocks other than the tariﬀ reductions in the maternal industry j and the paternal industry
k. Finally, eiht is an i.i.d. error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated to child schooling.
The above equation is estimated with and without the fertility variable nht using the linear
probability model. The results are reported in Table 4, columns 1 and 2.6 Maternal labor supply is
estimated to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on child schooling, whereas paternal labor supply
is found to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect. A one day increase in maternal labor supply increases the
child schooling rate by 0.5 percentage points. Household characteristics have the expected eﬀects
on schooling probability. A one percent increase in per capita household expenditure increases
the schooling probability by 7.7 percent and a one percent increase in land owning increases the
schooling probability by 0.9 percent. Rural children were approximately 10 percent less likely, and
boys were approximately 14 percent more likely, to attend school. Age controls turned out to be
insigniﬁcant for these children as age was not a strong determinant of schooling probability.
There were signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the mothers and fathers in terms of their labor market
characteristics. The mother’s age was negatively related, and father’s age was positively related, to
the schooling probability. As the mother gets one year older, the schooling probability decreased by
1.2 percentage points. And as the father gets one year older, the schooling probability increased by
0.8 percentage points, after controlling for per capita expenditure and number of children within the
household for both genders. Children were 16 percent more likely to attend school if their mother
had any schooling and 18 percent more likely to attend school if their father had any schooling.7
Each additional child reduced the schooling probability by 3.3 percentage points.8
6In order to account for within-household correlation, all reported standard errors are clustered at the household
level. Sampling weights are used in the analysis.
7Other household control variables, such as religion, social class, location, year ﬁxed eﬀects, and industry ﬁxed
eﬀects for the mother and father turned out to be important determinants of schooling, although they are not reported
in the table.
8According to the estimation results that are reported in the Appendix, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant intra-household
bargaining eﬀects for children between the ages of 11-14. Other coeﬃcients are also diﬀerent for this age group.
Boys are approximately 25 percentage points more likely to attend school and age signiﬁcantly reduces schooling
probability at a diminishing rate. Land owned has a much smaller impact on the schooling probability. Because
children in this age group are old enough to be productive in the labor market, one would need to interpret these
results with respect to the labor market opportunities available to them, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
13In order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we deﬁne a new variable which indicates
when the mother supplies more market labor than the father. This new variable, Maternal minus









[Mht − Pht] > 1
[Mht − Pht] ≤ 1
(2)
This variable essentially marks the households in which the mother supplies one day or more
market labor than the father, and allows us to compare these households to the households in which
the mother supplies less or equal amount of market labor, where ‘equal’ means that the diﬀerence
is less than one work day a week. If the labor supplied to the market is a source of bargaining
power, households with [Mht − Pht] > 1 should have higher levels of schooling after controlling for
per capita household expenditure. The results are presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4. The
results indicate that children in households in which the mother supplied more market labor had
approximately 4.5 percentage points more schooling relative to the other households (column 5).
This estimate decreases to 3.9 percentage points if we control for the number of children (column 6),
indicating that there is a signiﬁcant amount of re-allocation between home and market production.
5.2 Schooling, Labor Supply and Tariﬀ Reduction
Individuals face a tradeoﬀ between home and market production. In households with a large
number of children, the value of home production is relatively higher, therefore we should see less
market labor supply, especially for the mother. In addition, the specialization between the mother
and father will be more signiﬁcant for households with a larger number of children. Both of these
eﬀects point to lower labor supply of mothers in households with a larger number of children.
In addition, we know as an empirical fact that households with a large number of children also
have lower school attendance rates. This is presumably due to the binding budget constraint and
the tradeoﬀ between child quality and quantity. Considering this mechanism within a household, it
is very hard to argue that labor supply is exogenous to child quality. Households where the mother
supplies relatively more labor to the market would systematically choose a low fertility-high quality
equilibrium. At the same time, higher schooling rates require the parents to supply more labor
14to the market in order to provide for the schooling costs. In this case, the eﬀect of an exogenous
increase in labor supply on child quality will be overestimated.
We estimate equation (1) with 2SLS by instrumenting the labor supply variables with a two-
year lag of log tariﬀ rates, ln(tj,t−2) and ln(tk,t−2), in the maternal and paternal industries j and
k, respectively. Changes in tariﬀ rates signiﬁcantly aﬀect the labor supply of parents and thus the
schooling probability of children. In this section, we present our results with various speciﬁcations
that incorporate tariﬀ rates in parental industries.
The ﬁrst column in Table 5 reports the results with maternal and paternal labor supply instru-
mented with tariﬀ rates in maternal and paternal industries, respectively. The eﬀect of maternal
labor supply remains positive and signiﬁcant after it is instrumented with the tariﬀ rate in her
industry. In fact, the magnitude of the estimate is much higher; a one day a week increase in a
mother’s market labor supply corresponds to a 6.7 percentage point increase in schooling probabil-
ity. If we do not incorporate paternal labor supply into the regression, the eﬀect remains signiﬁcant,
although it decreases to 4.5 percentage points. Paternal labor supply remains insigniﬁcant under
all speciﬁcations. First stage results are reported in the lower portion of Table 5. Both tariﬀ rates
in maternal and paternal industries are signiﬁcant determinants of the labor supplied to market
activities. The tariﬀ rate is generally a stronger determinant of the mother’s labor supply, as
indicated by higher ﬁrst stage F-statistics in these regressions.
The results suggest a one work day a week increase in female labor supply is associated with an
approximately 5 percentage point increase in the schooling probability of children between the ages
of 7 and 10. This estimate is higher than our OLS estimates, which suggests that the covariance
between female labor supply and the error term is negative in the OLS regressions. In addition
to the mechanism described above, this would happen when women with low labor supply have
disproportionately high schooling among their children due to some unobserved characteristics.
For example, women with low labor market attachment may have relatively high bargaining
power due to assets brought to the marriage, or other factors that may aﬀect female autonomy
that are not observable to us. If these women also have a lower tendency to participate in the labor
market, OLS would underestimate the eﬀect. Endogenous family formation can be another expla-
nation of the direction of the bias of the OLS estimates. If women with low interest in the labor
market are matching to men with relatively high preferences towards child quality, the selection
15bias arising from the endogenous family formation would bias the OLS estimates downward. Unfor-
tunately, we observe these couples after they match and do not have information on the matching
process. All of these explanations lead us toward the existence of endogeneity bias that leads to
a negative correlation between the coeﬃcient of interest and the error term, which is corrected by
instrumentation.
Within this time period, tariﬀ rates in manufacturing industries were reduced approximately
70 percent. According to our estimates, this tariﬀ reduction leads to a 1.6 day a week increase in a
mother’s labor supplied outside of the household. This in turn, increased the schooling probability
of children by approximately 7 percentage points. Male labor supply also increased as a result of
the tariﬀ reduction, but this has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on schooling probability.
5.3 Endogeneous Number of Children
When analyzing the eﬀect of parental labor supply on schooling probability, the number of children
is a potential source of bias, as it changes the value of household labor and is thus is endogenous
to the schooling probability. Equation (1) includes the endogenous choice of number of children by
the decision maker, which may bias our estimates ofα1 and α2. Households with a large number
of children may be composed of parents who have have weak preferences for schooling. Hence,
fertility and schooling artes may be simultanously determined. This would bias our estimates if
these households are also structurally diﬀerent in terms of the amount of labor they supply to the
market. Next, we develop an instrument for the number of children.
5.3.1 Gender Composition among the First Two Children
Following the deﬁnition by Angrist and Evans (1998), we deﬁne the gender composition as the
following:
sh = b1hb2h + g1hg2h = b1hb2h + (1 − b1h)(1 − b2h) (3)
where b1h is an indicator variable that marks the households in which the ﬁrst child is a boy, b2h
marks the households in which the second child is boy, g1h marks the households in which the ﬁrst
child is a girl, and g2h marks the households in which the second child is a girl. Naturally, we have
16g1h = 1 − b1h and g2h = 1 − b2h. Our ﬁrst gender composition variable sh will be an indicator
variable that takes the value of one if the ﬁrst two children are of the same gender. In what follows
we will call these households same-gender households.
What makes the gender composition a strong exogenous determinant for fertility is that it is
given to the family by nature. Families are not able to determine the gender of their children.9 If
gender composition is completely random, then the only way it can aﬀect child schooling would
be through fertility, making it a strong exclusion restriction. The argument is the following: if
families have a preference for a mixed-gender composition among their children, and if the ﬁrst
two children are of the same gender, then they will have a higher probability of having a third
child and on average they will have higher fertility rates. Because the instrument is an indicator
variable, our identifying assumption is straightforward. Identiﬁcation requires that same-gender
households are not structurally diﬀerent than other households after controlling for household and
parent characteristics. In other words:
E[yiht | Xh, Xmjh, Xpkh, nh ; sh = 0] = E[yiht | Xh, Xmjh, Xpkh, nh ; sh = 1] (4)
where yiht is a binary variable for whether or not child i in household h in time t attends school, Xh
contains household characteristics, Xmjh and Xpkh are labor market characteristics and industry
characteristics of the mother and father who are working in industry j and industry k, respectively,
and nh is the number of children in household h.
In order to test the validity of the same-gender variable as an instrument for fertility, we
decompose sh into households in which the ﬁrst two children are both boys or both girls and test
whether there are structural diﬀerences between these families and the rest of the population. We
will call these households two-boy and two-girl households.
Table 6 presents some summary statistics for the three gender composition variables. Same-
gender households have 0.12 more children on average, which is statistically signiﬁcant. Two-girl
households have on average 0.09 more children and two-boy households have on average 0.07 more
children, both statistically signiﬁcant. The ﬁrst piece of evidence towards boy-preference is that
9One criticism of this view is the possibility of pre-birth gender selection which argues that if families have strong
preferences toward boys, then they may choose to terminate the pregnancy once they learn the baby is a girl. Also,
if infant mortality is higher among girls, families will have more boys among their living children. In either case,
gender composition will not be random.
17two-girl households tend to have more children than two-boy households.
In terms of average per capita expenditure, there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
same-gender (two-boy or two-girl) households relative to the rest of the households. However, we
observe an interesting pattern in the maternal and paternal education variables. Education is
deﬁned as an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the parent had any schooling. Parents
in two-boy households have signiﬁcantly less education. Speciﬁcally, in two-boy households 2.4
percent fewer mothers and 1.9 percent fewer fathers had any education. The education levels of
families with two girls are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the rest of the population.
Because sh is composed of these two groups, we observe that parents in same-gender households
also have signiﬁcantly less education. Further, there are a disproportionately high number of
households with two boys. Assuming that there is a 50 percent probability for each gender, the
probability of two-boy and two-girl combinations should each be 25 percent. However, about 26
percent of households had two boys and 24 percent of households had two girls in the ﬁrst two
births. Although the data does not contain information on gender selection prior to birth, these
three pieces of evidence point toward a preference for male children. The data also suggest that
the gender selection occurs among less educated households. The two-girl indicator is thus our
preferred instrument for fertility.
5.3.2 Schooling, Labor Supply and Number of Children:
In this section, we instrument the number of children with the gender composition variables. The
ﬁrst column in Table 7 reports results that use the same-gender instrument. Paternal labor supply
turns out to be signiﬁcant under this speciﬁcation. A one work day increase in paternal labor
supply was associated with a 0.3 percentage point reduction in schooling. Results with our preferred
instrument, the two-girl indicator, are presented in Column (4). The eﬀect of maternal labor supply
is higher under this speciﬁcation relative to the speciﬁcations in Table 4 and the eﬀect of paternal
labor supply is insigniﬁcant. These results indicate that households in a large number of children-
low schooling equilibrium report signiﬁcantly lower maternal labor supplied to the market. Once
the endogenous fertility is taken into account, the eﬀect of maternal labor supply is increased.
The number of children, once instrumented, turned out to be insigniﬁcant under both instru-
ments. The same gender households had on average 0.13 more children, and two girl households
18had on average 0.21 more children. Although the fertility coeﬃcient on the number of children
becomes insigniﬁcant once instrumented, the impact of maternal labor supply remains positive and
signiﬁcant.
In our last speciﬁcation we use both tariﬀ and gender composition instruments in order to
determine whether our labor supply results are robust to the inclusion of endogenous fertility.
These results are presented in Table 8. Column (1) incorporates both maternal and paternal labor
supply. The point estimates of α1 and α2 are slightly higher under this speciﬁcation relative to
Table 4, however, the diﬀerence is small. According to the estimates in Column (1), a one day
a week increase in maternal labor supply increases schooling probability by 7 percentage points,
while paternal labor supply has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on schooling. Combined with the ﬁrst stage
estimates, the results suggest that tariﬀ reductions increased maternal labor supply by 1.56 days
per week which translates into an increase in the schooling probability of 7.6 percentage points.
6 Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that studies the relationship between globalization and
human capital formation in an intra-household bargaining framework. Within each household, the
mother and father face a tradeoﬀ between home production and market production. Parental labor
supply is thus simultaneously determined with child outcomes, which may lead to an overestimation
of the eﬀect on child schooling. This paper uses variations in tariﬀ rates to identify this relationship.
Substantial trade liberalization that took place in India and the accompanying employment surveys
allow us to investigate the diﬀerential eﬀects of changes in maternal and paternal labor supply
induced by tariﬀ reductions on child schooling.
In the ﬁrst stage, this paper investigates the link between tariﬀ reductions and labor market
opportunities by focusing on the kind of labor that can generate independent income for women
and improve female autonomy. If the overall labor market eﬀects are gender-speciﬁc, then maternal
and paternal labor supply will be diﬀerentially aﬀected which will subsequently shift the relative
bargaining power within the household. In the second stage, the change in labor market oppor-
tunities in addition to heterogeneous preferences of mothers and fathers lead to changes in child
schooling rates.
19Our results show that lower tariﬀs are associated with higher market labor supply for both the
mother and father. An increase in maternal labor supply induced by tariﬀ reductions has increased
the schooling probability of children between the ages of 7 and 10 by 7 percentage points, whereas
an increase in paternal labor supply has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on this probability. This channel
explains approximately 26 percent of the improvement in schooling for this age group between the
years of 1988 and 2000.
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Notes:  Schooling rates are shown for children between the ages of 7 and 10. Each bar represents schooling rates 
within a cell specified by year, sector and number of children.  Households with more than 7 children are not shown 
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Table 1: Activities of Children by Age Groups 
PANEL 1: 1988 









Work Idle  Total 
0-6  3,823  14  24 32,881 36,742  4,650  18  14  35,242  39,924 
0.10 0.00  0.00 0.89 1.00  0.12 0.00  0.00  0.88  1.00 
7-10  12,626  432  794 10,578 24,430  15,994  576  141  10,378  27,089 
0.52 0.02  0.03 0.43 1.00  0.59 0.02  0.01  0.38  1.00 
11-14  11,972 1,790  3,675 2,613  16,375 17,744  2,715  309  2,547  23,315 
0.60 0.09  0.18 0.13 1.00  0.76 0.12  0.01  0.11  1.00 
PANEL 2: 1993 









Work Idle  Total 
0-6  5,157  10  37 23,486 28,690  6,266  13  11  24,804  31,094 
0.18 0.00  0.00 0.82 1.00  0.20 0.00  0.00  0.80  1.00 
7-10 14,646  340  659  4,111  19,756  18,832  384  97  3,255  22,568 
0.74 0.02  0.03 0.21 1.00  0.83 0.02  0.00  0.14  1.00 
11-14  11,678 1,071  2,419 1,258  16,426 16,063  1,634  155  1,319  19,171 
0.71 0.07  0.15 0.08 1.00  0.84 0.09  0.01  0.07  1.00 
PANEL 2: 2000 









Work Idle  Total 
0-6  5,677  8  25 21,811 27,521  6,648  7  29  22,876  29,560 
0.21 0.00  0.00 0.79 1.00  0.22 0.00  0.00  0.77  1.00 
7-10 15,931  178  350  3,701  20,160  19,397  220  78  2,914  22,609 
0.79 0.01  0.02 0.18 1.00  0.86 0.01  0.00  0.13  1.00 
11-14 13,646  954  2,045  1,755  18,400 17,179  1,424  151  1,756  20,510 
0.74 0.05  0.11 0.10 1.00  0.84 0.07  0.01  0.09  1.00 
Notes:  Schooling category includes children who reported schooling as their principal activity (code 91). Market work category 
corresponds to the following activities: worked in household enterprise as paid or unpaid worker, worked as regular wage/salaried 
employee, worked as casual wage labor in public works or in other types of work, worked as beggar, etc. (codes 11-51 and 96).  
Domestic work category corresponds to the following activities: attended domestic duties and engaged in free collection of good, 
sewing, tailoring, weaving, etc. for household use (code 92-93). Numbers in italics represent the proportion of children within an 
age/gender group engaged in the specified activity. 25 
 
Table 2: Household Characteristics and Labor Market Activity of Parents 
Number of Children 
Average Per Capita 
Expenditure (log)  Parental Education 
Urban Rural 
Year  Urban  Rural Urban  Rural Mothers  Fathers  Mothers  Fathers 
1988 2.396  2.517  5.292  4.917  0.581 0.805  0.241 0.527 
(1.277) (1.301)  (0.794) (0.728)  (0.493) (0.396)  (0.428) (0.499) 
1993 2.259  2.408  5.525  5.118  0.637 0.824  0.307 0.578 
(1.172) (1.235)  (0.583) (0.488)  (0.481) (0.381)  (0.461) (0.494) 
2000 2.183  2.441  5.528  5.068  0.671 0.830  0.344 0.595 
(1.184) (1.278)  (0.556) (0.450)  (0.470) (0.375)  (0.475) (0.491) 
Participation in Market Work  Labor Supply in Market Work (days/week) 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Year  Mothers Fathers  Mothers Fathers  Mothers Fathers  Mothers Fathers 
1988 0.118  0.587  0.261  0.410  0.534 3.395  0.765 2.253 
(0.323) (0.492)  (0.439) (0.492)  (1.729) (3.080)  (2.029) (3.015) 
1993 0.139  0.626  0.299  0.477  0.638 3.772  0.830 2.525 
(0.346) (0.484)  (0.458) (0.499)  (1.919) (3.315)  (2.079) (3.133) 
2000 0.140  0.587  0.325  0.467  0.606 3.572  0.870 2.560 
(0.347) (0.492)  (0.468) (0.500)  (1.862) (3.254)  (2.082) (3.084) 
                                      
Notes:  Per capita expenditure variable is corrected for inflation. Parental education is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if the parent had any schooling. Labor market variables are based on market work only. Following categories 
are included as market work: worked as regular wage/salaried employee, worked as casual wage labor in public works or in 














Table 3: Tariffs Rates by Years 
Agriculture Mining  Manufacturing 
1988 116.235  117.464  152.440 
(36.530) (22.923)  (22.846) 
1993 72.488  85.000  84.787 
(14.697) (0.000)  (8.943) 
2000 35.935  18.384  38.312 
(7.817) (7.612)  (7.854) 
Notes:  Tariff data obtained from Asian Development Bank and aggregated over 1 digit NIC 
1987. In the rest of the analysis 2-digit classification is used. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4: Schooling and Parental Labor Supply - Simple OLS Results 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Maternal  Labor  Supply  0.0054*** 0.0048*** 0.0031** 
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0014) 
Paternal Labor Supply  -0.0026  -0.0027  0.0003 
(0.0017) (0.0017)  (0.0013) 
MPLS=I(MLS-PLS>1) 0.0447***  0.0389*** 
(0.0134) (0.0133) 
Number of Children  -0.0330***  -0.0330***  -0.0332***  -0.0330*** 
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)  (0.0029) 
Household Characteristics 
Per-Cap Expenditure (log)  0.0768***  0.0579*** 0.0586*** 0.0573*** 0.0762*** 0.0576*** 
(0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0075) 
Land Owned (log)  0.0087***  0.0102*** 0.0111*** 0.0094*** 0.0074*** 0.0093*** 
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Rural  -0.1046*** -0.1073*** -0.1071*** -0.1075*** -0.1044*** -0.1072*** 
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
Child Characteristics 
Boy  0.1462*** 0.1406*** 0.1407*** 0.1403*** 0.1462*** 0.1405*** 
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) 
Age  0.0564 0.0752 0.0772 0.0821 0.0617 0.081 
(0.0519) (0.0521) (0.0521) (0.0522) (0.052)  (0.0521) 
Age-Squared  -0.0021 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0037 -0.0024 -0.0036 
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Parental Characteristics 
Mother  Age  -0.0120*** -0.0116*** -0.0116*** -0.0116*** -0.0119*** -0.0115*** 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Father Age  0.0085***  0.0076***  0.0076*** 0.0076*** 0.0084*** 0.0075*** 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Mother Attended School  0.1617***  0.1536*** 0.1533*** 0.1530*** 0.1615*** 0.1534*** 
(0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0088) 
Father Attended School  0.1823***  0.1830*** 0.1835*** 0.1827*** 0.1811*** 0.1821*** 
    (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
Number of Observations  29,886  29,886 29,900 29,924 29,941 29,941 
R-squared  0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 
Notes: Dependent variable child schooling is an indicator variable that is constructed based on principal activity of the child (activity code 91). 
Sample includes children between ages 7 and 10 whose parents are employed in traded industries. Labor supply is defined as days/week labor 
supplied in the following labor market activities: worked as regular salaried/wage employee, worked as casual wage labor in public works and 
in other types of works (activity codes 31-51). MPLS is an indicator variable that marks the households in which the difference between 
maternal labor supply and paternal labor supply is positive and larger than one work day a week. All standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at household level. Additional controls include industry fixed effects for both maternal and paternal industries, 





Table 5: Schooling and Parental Labor Supply - IV Results 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Maternal Labor Supply  0.0666**  0.0455* 
(0.0340) (0.0269) 
Paternal Labor Supply  -0.0335  0.0110 
(0.0518) (0.0378) 
Number of Children  -0.0305***  -0.0299***  -0.0328*** 
(0.0041) (0.0037)  (0.0038) 
Household Characteristics 
Per-Cap Expenditure (log)  0.0705***  0.0791***  0.0631*** 
(0.0244) (0.0155)  (0.0228) 
Land Owned (log)  0.0265  0.0392**  0.018 
(0.0320) (0.0177)  (0.0298) 
Rural -0.1063***  -0.1074***  -0.1090*** 
(0.0154) (0.0148)  (0.0145) 
Child Characteristics 
Boy 0.1393***  0.1393***  0.1380*** 
(0.0068) (0.0066)  (0.0066) 
Age 0.0534  0.0706  0.0872 
(0.0583) (0.0522)  (0.0543) 
Age-Squared -0.0021  -0.0030  -0.0040 
(0.0034) (0.0031)  (0.0032) 
Parental Characteristics 
Mother Age  -0.0105***  -0.0103***  -0.0112*** 
(0.0017) (0.0015)  (0.0016) 
Father Age  0.0066***  0.0071***  0.0076*** 
(0.0012) (0.0012)  (0.0011) 
Mother Attended School  0.1569***  0.1543***  0.1499*** 
(0.0102) (0.0098)  (0.0089) 
Father Attended School  0.1895***  0.1957***  0.1878*** 
   (0.0169)  (0.0108)  (0.0156) 
First Stage :  
Tariff in Maternal Industry (log)  -2.8790***   -2.1933*** 
(0.5648) (0.3809) 
F-Statistics 17.42  33.15 
Tariff in Paternal Industry (log)  -1.1918***   -1.5884*** 
(0.6407) (0.4273) 
F-Statistics 7.18      13.81 
Number of Observations  29,886  29,900  29,924 
R-squared 0.24  0.24  0.24 
Notes:   Dependent variable child schooling is an indicator variable that is constructed based on principal activity of the child 
(activity code 91). Sample includes children between ages 7 and 10 whose parents are employed in traded industries. Labor 
supply is defined as days/week labor supplied in the following labor market activities: worked as regular salaried/wage employee, 
worked as casual wage labor in public works and in other types of works (activity codes 31-51). All standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at household level. Additional controls include industry fixed effects for both maternal and 
paternal industries, states, year fixed effects, social group of the household (caste, tribe) and religion of the household.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Fertility and Household Characteristics by Gender Composition 
Gender composition 
of first two children 
Number of 
Households 
Average number of 









Same Gender =1  5563  2.664  5.260   0.153  0.393 
(0.0156) (0.009)  (0.005)    (0.006) 
Same Gender =0  5527  2.542  5.279  0.167  0.412 
(0.0149) (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Difference   0.122***  -0.019  -0.014**   -0.027*** 
(0.021) (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Two Girls=1  2681  2.674  5.262  0.164  0.394 
(0.024) (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Two Girls=0  8409  2.580  5.271  0.159  0.410 
(0.012) (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Difference 0.094***  -0.009  0.006  -0.015 
(0.025) (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
Two Boys=1  2846  2.655  5.257  0.142  0.391 
(0.020)  (0.013) (0.006)  (0.005) 
Two Boys=0  8244  2.585  5.273  0.167  0.411 
(0.013)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Difference 0.070***  -0.015  -0.024***  -0.019** 
(0.025) (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
        
Notes:  Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. Maternal and paternal education is measured as an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if they had any schooling. The difference between group averages is tested against the t-


















Table 7: Child Schooling and Parental Labor Supply - IV Results 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Maternal Labor Supply  0.0042**  0.0062*** 
(0.0020) (0.0020) 
Paternal Labor Supply  -0.0029*  -0.0024 
(0.0017) (0.0018) 
MPLS=I(MLS-PLS>1) 0.0317*  0.0536*** 
(0.0163) (0.0158) 
Number of Children  -0.0738  0.0492  0.0512  0.0512 
(0.0512) (0.0435) (0.0436) (0.0436) 
Household Characteristics 
Per-Cap Expenditure (log)  0.0346  0.1049***  0.0343  0.1051*** 
(0.0301) (0.0259) (0.0302) (0.0256) 
Land Owned (log)  0.0119***  0.0066*  0.0116***  0.0045 
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0035) 
Rural  -0.1107*** -0.1005*** -0.1107*** -0.1001*** 
(0.0151) (0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0146) 
Child Characteristics 
Boy  0.1336*** 0.1546*** 0.1335*** 0.1549*** 
(0.0108) (0.0093) (0.0110) (0.0093) 
Age  0.0985 0.0283 0.1050*  0.0319 
(0.0613) (0.0592) (0.0619) (0.0595) 
Age-Squared  -0.0048 -0.0004 -0.0051 -0.0006 
(0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0035) 
Parental Characteristics 
Mother  Age  -0.0111*** -0.0126*** -0.0110*** -0.0125*** 
(0.0013) (0.0013) -0.0013  -0.0013 
Father  Age  0.0064*** 0.0099*** 0.0063*** 0.0099*** 
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0016) 
Mother  Attended  School  0.1435*** 0.1738*** 0.1432*** 0.1741*** 
(0.0155) (0.0141) (0.0157) (0.0141) 
Father Attended School  0.1838*** 0.1813*** 0.1832*** 0.1797*** 
    (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0080) 
First Stage Results:  
Same Gender  0.1357***      0.1302*** 
(0.0034)   (0.0034) 
F-Statistics 38.33  37.03 
Two Girls  0.2103***  0.2108*** 
(0.0044) (0.0044) 
F-Statistics     55.38    56.02 
Number  of  Observations  29,886 29,886 29,941 29,941 
R-squared  0.24 0.23 0.23 0.19 
Notes:   Dependent variable child schooling is an indicator variable that is constructed based on principal activity of the child (activity code 
91). Sample includes children between ages 7 and 10 whose parents are employed in traded industries. Labor supply is defined as days/week 
labor supplied in the following labor market activities: worked as regular salaried/wage employee, worked as casual wage labor in public 
works and in other types of works (activity codes 31-51). MPLS is an indicator variable that marks the households in which the difference 
between maternal labor supply and paternal labor supply is positive and larger than one work day a week. Regressions with two boys 
instrument are not reported due to the weakness of the instrument (first stage F statistics is 0.10). All standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at household level. Additional controls include industry fixed effects for both maternal and paternal industries, 
states, year fixed effects, social group of the household (caste, tribe) and religion of the household. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 31 
 
Table 8: Schooling, Parental Labor Supply, Trade and Number of Children 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Maternal Labor Supply  0.0706**  0.0489* 
(0.0349) (0.0270) 
Paternal Labor Supply  -0.0355  0.0125 
(0.0530) (0.0388) 
Number of Children  0.0376  0.0336  0.0533 
(0.0463) (0.0438)  (0.0456) 
Household Characteristics 
Per-Cap Expenditure (log)  0.1094***  0.1162***  0.1120*** 
(0.0300) (0.0272)  (0.0288) 
Land Owned (log)  0.0237  0.0378**  0.0143 
(0.0332) (0.0183)  (0.0315) 
Rural -0.1006***  -0.1022***  -0.1015*** 
(0.0158) (0.0152)  (0.0150) 
Child Characteristics 
Boy 0.1511***  0.1502***  0.1528*** 
(0.0104) (0.0096)  (0.0101) 
Age 0.0135  0.0341  0.0387 
(0.0679) (0.0588)  (0.0641) 
Age-Squared 0.0004  -0.0008  -0.0009 
(0.004) (0.0035)  (0.0038) 
Parental Characteristics 
Mother Age  -0.0113***  -0.0110***  -0.0123*** 
(0.0019) (0.0017)  (0.0019) 
Father Age  0.0085***  0.0089***  0.0101*** 
(0.0018) (0.0018)  (0.0017) 
Mother Attended School  0.1735***  0.1698***  0.1704*** 
(0.0157) (0.0144)  (0.0147) 
Father Attended School  0.1882***  0.1952***  0.1861*** 
   (0.0175)  (0.0111)  (0.0165) 
First Stage :  
Tariff in Maternal Industry (log)   -2.8899***  -2.1997*** 
(0.5654) (0.3823) 
F-Statistics 12.17  17.85 
Tariff in Paternal Industry (log)  -1.1833***  -1.5866*** 
(0.6398) (0.4278) 
F-Statistics 5.29  7.79 
Two Girls  0.2123*** 0.2137***  0.2128*** 
(0.0287) (0.0285)  (0.0286) 
F Statistics  18.37 28.06  27.66 
Number of Observations  29,257  29,450  29,368 
R-squared 0.14  0.16  0.19 
Notes:   Dependent variable child schooling is an indicator variable that is constructed based on principal activity of the child (activity code 
91). Sample includes children between ages 7 and 10 whose parents are employed in traded industries. Labor supply is defined as 
days/week labor supplied in the following labor market activities: worked as regular salaried/wage employee, worked as casual wage labor 
in public works and in other types of works (activity codes 31-51). All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at 
household level. Additional controls include industry fixed effects for both maternal and paternal industries, states, year fixed effects, 
social group of the household (caste, tribe) and religion of the household. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 32 
 
APPENDIX   
 
 
Table A1:   Description of the main variables 
 
Child Schooling:  
 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the child’s principal activity reported as ‘schooling’, which is code 91 in the 
NSS data. We generated a second schooling variable based on the question about the ‘current attendance to educational 
institution’ which specifies the type of school the person is registered. This variable 98 percent matched to the schooling 
variable generated by principal activity. However, this is not our preferred schooling definition as it takes the value of one when 
the child is registered to school, but not necessarily pursuing a continuous education.  
 
Parental Labor Supply:  
 
Labor supply in the following market activities: worked as regular salaried/wage employee, worked as casual wage labor in 
public works and in other types of works, which are activity codes 31-51 in the NSS data. The variable includes non-




Tariff variable is based on Indian Input-Output table for 1991 and aggregated over 2-digit NIC-87 categories to match the 
industry definition used in the NSS data. 
 
Number of Children:  
  
Number of all children in the household, including the children that are younger than 7 and older than 10 years of age.   
 
Monthly Per Capita Expenditure: 
  
This variable is recorded in the survey as it is. We correct the expenditure for inflation using the Current Price Index obtained 
from the Reserve Bank of India. 
 
Land Ownership:  
 
Land owned as of the date of survey in hectares.  
 
School Attendance of Parents:   
 
This variable is constructed from ‘educational status’ question in the survey which records the highest education attained by the 
members of the household. The individuals who are literate through NFEC, AEC, TLC and other government programs, literate 
but below primary, primary, secondary, higher secondary and graduate degrees are considered to have received schooling. 
Individuals who cannot read and write a simple message in any language are considered illiterate and they are assigned a value 
















Table A2: Schooling and Parental Labor Supply: Results for children between the ages of 11 and 14 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Maternal Labor Supply  -0.0012  -0.0022  -0.0028 
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0017) 
Paternal Labor Supply  -0.0010  -0.0010  -0.0023 
(0.0021) (-0.0020)  (0.0016) 
MPLS=I(MLS-PLS>1) 
Number of Children  -0.0387***  -0.0388***  -0.0387*** 
(0.0031) (0.0031)  (0.0031) 
Household Characteristics 
Per-Cap Expenditure (log)  0.0896***  0.0642***  0.0640***  0.0642*** 
(0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0082)  (0.0082) 
Land Owned (log)  0.0047  0.0059*  0.0062**  0.0061** 
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030)  (0.0030) 
Rural -0.0466***  -0.0509***  -0.0507***  -0.0512*** 
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160)  -0.016 
Child Characteristics 
Boy 0.2458***  0.2367***  0.2365***  0.2369*** 
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076)  (0.0076) 
Age -0.3231***  -0.3588***  -0.3601***  -0.3556*** 
(0.0906) (0.0897) (0.0898)  (0.0896) 
Age-Squared 0.0105***  0.0119***  0.0119***  0.0118*** 
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)  (0.0036) 
Parental Characteristics 
Mother Age  -0.0029**  -0.0037***  -0.0037***  -0.0036*** 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)  (0.0013) 
Father Age  0.0017  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)  (0.0012) 
Mother Attended School  0.1615***  0.1543***  0.1541***  0.1538*** 
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105)  (0.0105) 
Father Attended School  0.1835*** 0.1814*** 0.1815***  0.1820*** 
   (0.0088)  (0.0087)  (0.0087)  (0.0086) 
Number of Observations  23,435  23,435  23,443  23,447 
R-squared 0.20  0.21  0.21  0.21 
Notes:  Dependent variable child schooling is an indicator variable that is constructed based on principal 
activity of the child (activity code 91). Labor supply is defined as days/week labor supplied in the 
following labor market activities: worked as regular salaried/wage employee, worked as casual wage labor 
in public works and in other types of works (activity codes 31-51). All standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at household level. Additional controls include industry fixed effects for 
both maternal and paternal industries, states, year fixed effects, social group of the household (caste, tribe) 
and religion of the household. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 